

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

263

35-H

Action

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 4966

Rec'd: November 14, 1962

1:44 p.m.

EUR

Info

FROM: Oslo

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

NO: 235, November 14, 6 p.m.

SP

L

SAL

ARA

IO

DAC

P

IOP

INR

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 235, INFORMATION USUN 24, STOCKHOLM, COPENHAGEN, HELSINKI, PARIS UNRECORDED

PARIS FOR USRO

EMBTTEL 229.

Cuba

REVIEWED by

DATE

☐ RELEASE☐ DECLASSIFY☐ EXCISE☐ DECLASSIFY in PART☒ DENY

Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions

TS authority to:

☐ CLASSIFY as

OADR

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

During my call by Cuban Ambassador Alonso at own request on Foreign Minister Lange November 7 following points were made

Core of Alonso's remarks:

- (1) On instruction requested GON opinion of grounds under international law for "continued violations" by US of Cuban territorial integrity and for imposition of inspection by UN.
- (2) Referred to U-2 shot down in Cuba and said GOC still possessed defensive ground-to-air missiles and could not guarantee new incidents would not occur.
- (3) Asserted as personal observation his government would never accept any kind of international inspection even if US threatened invasion.
- (4) Expressed apprehension inspection of missile dismantling could

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

JLW

11/17/62

B-1

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 235, November 14, 6 p.m. from Oslo

could lead to broader inspection of Cuban territory.

(5) Suggested inspection be conducted in international waters.

(6) Commented that effect of action would be to give US and UN right to decide what weapons Cuba would be allowed to possess.

Core of Lange's remarks:

(1) Welcomed opportunity to convey to Cuban Government GON opinion that Cuba would make valuable contribution to solution of crisis by accepting inspection by independent organ such as UN, ICRC or multi-national LA arrangement.

(2) GON said views based on finding pragmatic solution not on juridical considerations and stressed precedent of UAR willingness accept UN inspection in Suez crisis and example Norwegian willingness accept Arctic Region inspection.

(3) Pointed out inspection was key point in US-Soviet agreement, inspection in international waters inadequate and unreasonable expect US stop overflights until adequate inspection.

(4) Said if Cuba really felt it important stop US overflights, it was in Cuban interest accept temporary inspection.

(5) Noted Cuba had opportunity make important contribution to disarmament negotiations since Cuba inspection precedent could have important bearing.

In commenting [] noted these aspects of 42
Alonso's

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 235, November 14, 6 p.m. from Oslo

Alonso's presentation:

(1) Particular stress on sovereignty in inspection issue;
(2) his failure to raise other points of Castro declaration, notably Guantanamo; (3) vigor with which Alonso presented what he claimed were personal observations.

[] said Alonso, who is likewise accredited to Sweden, subsequently approached Swedish Foreign Office along similar lines, and acknowledged to Swedes that approaches were being made to other neutral countries, but was evasive as to whether he had approached Norway. ^{A3}

WHARTON

DT

CONFIDENTIAL